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Size Matters: Entrepreneurial Entry and Government 
 
We explore the country-specific institutional characteristics likely to influence an individual’s 
decision to become an entrepreneur. We focus on the size of the government, on freedom 
from corruption, and on ‘market freedom’ defined as a cluster of variables related to 
protection of property rights and regulation. We test these relationships by combining 
country-level institutional indicators for 47 countries with working age population survey data 
taken from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor. Our results indicate that entrepreneurial 
entry is inversely related to the size of the government, and more weakly to the extent of 
corruption. A cluster of institutional indicators representing ‘market freedom’ is only significant 
in some specifications. Freedom from corruption is significantly related to entrepreneurial 
entry, especially when the richest countries are removed from the sample but unlike the size 
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Existing research indicates that entrepreneurship and new firm entry
i fosters 
innovation and development; enhances employment creation; and ensures more equitable 
income distribution (Hirschman 1958; Baumol 1990; Acs 2006). However, these benefits 
depend on the institutional environment; where institutions are “weak”, entrepreneurs are less 
likely to undertake new projects or may instead focus their energies on unproductive ones 
(Glaeser et al., 2003; Johnson et al., 1997; Baumol 1990; Hodler, 2009). While there can be 
deficiencies in the institutional framework anywhere, it is normally argued that problems are 
especially serious in less developed economies. The literature has concentrated on the 
weaknesses in the rule of law, high levels of state regulation, and corruption (La Porta et al, 
1999; Djankov et al, 2002).  
In this paper, we compare the effects of these factors on individual entrepreneurial 
activity in the form of new business start-ups in 47 different countries. Using the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) dataset allows us to include all start-ups regardless of the 
legal form and to use information about the whole universe of potential entrepreneurs, rather 
than just of the existing business owners. In contrast, many existing studies focus on small 
enterprises requiring legal registration or on incorporated firms as a proxy for entrepreneurial 
activity.  Previous studies using GEM have also analysed cross-country variation in 
entrepreneurship (see also Schaffer et al 2005). In particular, Wennekers et al. (2005), Van 
Stel et al. (2007) and McMullen et al. (2008) use country averages to explore institutional 
influences on entrepreneurship. However, the literature has not considered explicitly the 3 
 
impact of particular institutions namely the size of the government, corruption and market 
supporting institutions more generally - on the choice of whether an individual will enter the 
market as an entrepreneur. Our methodology is akin to the approach adopted by Koellinger 
(2008): we merge individual GEM survey data and country-level data from other sources. We 
base our study on a conceptual framework which analyses the potential role of the state and 
corruption, as well as the quality of market supporting institutions on entrepreneurial entry. 
Moreover, we address potential issues of multicollinearity between institutions by using 
factor analysis prior to estimating our regression models. This renders results that are more 
robust and avoids the ad hoc specifications based on an arbitrary exclusion of indicators. By 
using institutional country-level variables as explanatory factors for the individual decision of 
a potential entrepreneur, we are also able to overcome the limitation of simultaneity bias 
prevalent in entrepreneurship studies based solely on country-level aggregate data.  
Analyzing the impact of the institutional environment for entrepreneurship poses a 
challenge for both theoretical and empirical research. The former arises because the 
conceptual framework linking individual choices to become entrepreneurs with the 
institutional environment remains underdeveloped. We build on Williamson’s (2000) model 
of hierarchy of institutions to consider the effects of, in turn: corruption, property rights and 
the size of the government sector on entrepreneurship. Institutions are difficult to measure in 
practice and the available indicators are often highly correlated with each other, leading to 
serious specification dilemmas (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005), but we employ factor 
analysis and use a large variety of indicators to ensure robustness for our findings.  
Our work establishes that two institutional dimensions –comprised of a cluster of 
variables associated with market supporting institutional quality that we label the market 
freedom and the size of the state sector respectively– are associated with the entrepreneurial 4 
 
entry.  The negative impact of the size of state is more robust: our results are confirmed by 
country-level fixed effects models. The impact of these institutions on entrepreneurship is 
shown to be conditional on the stage of economic development: for the richest 10% of 
countries little is explained by institutional variation. 
In the following section we analyze the effects of key institutions – corruption, 
property rights and the size of the state - on entrepreneurship. We also summarize the 
findings from the main existing studies so as to frame the current state of knowledge and 
identify our contribution. Our approach to quantifying indicators of the institutional 
environment is outlined in the third section and the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor dataset 
as well as our estimation methods in the fourth. Section 5 discusses our results and the paper 
concludes with Section 6. 
 
2. Unbundling Institutions and Entrepreneurship: Theory and Empirics   
 
2.1 Institutional theory and entrepreneurship: an introduction 
Organizations set up by entrepreneurs - North’s main agents of change (1997a) - 
adapt their activities and strategies to fit the opportunities and limitations provided through 
the institutional framework. Formal rules, designed to facilitate exchange by reducing 
transaction costs, are likely to affect individuals or groups in different ways. Since private 
interests may differ and individuals, who have their own narrow interests at heart, affect 
formal rules and institutions, the latter are not necessarily shaped in the interest of social 
well-being (North 1994; Olson, 2000).  
Moreover both formal and informal rules can be maintained even if they are 
inefficient (DiMaggio & Powell 1983; North 1990). This is because, even when they clash 5 
 
with new formal rules, informal norms have a tenacious ability to survive because they 
become habitual behaviour (i.e. culture). In this sense, informal institutions provide a sense 
of stability. Second, informal institutions may change more slowly due to path dependence.  
This occurs because institutional change is usually incremental and is seldom discontinuous 
(North 1990:10). Thirdly, lock-in can occur as a result of a symbiotic relationship between 
existing institutions and the organizations that have evolved as a result of the incentive 
structure provided by those institutions (ibid. 1990:7). 
  One can model potential entrepreneurs as maximizing their expected return against 
the alternatives when making a decision to start new ventures (Casson, 1982; Parker, 2004). 
In contexts where institutions are functioning effectively, the risks primarily stem from the 
nature of the ventures themselves and the characteristics of the individuals’ involved 
(Schumpeter, 1934; Kirzner, 1973). However, in a less developed economy, institutions may 
not provide sufficient underpinning to the functioning of the market economy and may 
influence both the potential returns from entrepreneurial activity and the variance around the 
expected income stream. 
To organise our discussion of these institutional factors, we rely on the model of 
hierarchy of institutions as presented by Williamson (2000, p. 597). We start with the level of 
“embeddedness”: corruption, when widespread, may be seen as an informal norm and, 
therefore belongs there. Next we move to the level of “formal rules of the game”, and 
following Williamson, we take the rules related to property as located at the core of this level, 
which may also be labelled ‘constitutional’ (see also Olson, 2000). Finally, we move to the 
level of governance. Here we first consider “the depth” and quality of governance as 
represented by various dimensions of regulation, those related directly to entrepreneurial 6 
 
entry in particular. Next we move to “the scope” of government activity, as proxied by the 
extent of state expenditure (and what follows, also by revenues).    
 
2.2. Corruption 
In the literature, corruption has been found to reflect the multi-dimensional impact of 
poor institutions in developing countries (Tanzi 1998). The significance of corruption as an 
indicator of institutional quality arises from the fact that it becomes institutionally embedded; 
where widespread it is transformed into a social norm of behaviour, which becomes difficult 
to change and responds only slowly to formal institutional reform. 
If we take corruption as a more fundamental (and less frequently changing) 
phenomenon than regulations, we can account for the inertia in informal institutions, as 
highlighted by North (1990). Corruption can become culturally embedded and in that sense 
becomes more than an equilibrium response to the current institutional setup. A good 
illustration of such a possibility comes from transition economies of Central and Eastern 
Europe. Estrin and Mickiewicz (2010) argue that change in informal institutions is socially 
embedded in generational change and therefore must be counted in decades rather than years. 
However, this interpretation has been brought into question by the finding in Djankov 
et al. (2002) that corruption levels and the intensity of entry regulations are positively 
correlated. This could suggest that ‘low level’ institutional characteristics of governance, 
notably  an inefficient, over-regulated environment, creates the conditions in which corrupt 
practices thrive, especially where officials are endowed with discretionary power. However, 
the critical assumption concerns which variables are seen as endogenous. Corruption may be 
viewed as endogenous when it is modelled as an equilibrium response to an overregulated 
environment (see also Hodler, 2009). We would argue however that the regulatory barriers 7 
 
may be endogenous vis-a-vis corruption because politicians are corrupt and seek to realise 
rents. As Shleifer and Vishny noted, corruption '...can also cause leaders of a country to 
maintain monopolies, to prevent entry, and to discourage innovation by outsiders if 
expanding the ranks of the elite can expose existing corruption practices' (1993:616).  
Even where corruption “greases the wheels of commerce”, it typically has a negative 
effect on economic development (Wei 2000; Aidt 2009). Corruption is detrimental for 
entrepreneurial entry in three ways: it may discourage potential entrepreneurs who are 
unwilling to engage in corrupt behaviour from ever starting a business.
ii Similarly, it may 
encourage unproductive and destructive forms of entrepreneurship (Baumol 1990) and breed 
negative societal attitudes towards entrepreneurs. Finally, a corrupt environment may prevent 
businesses from growing because they wish to avoid expropriation by corrupt officials, 
especially those involved with tax administration (Barkhatova 2000; Aidis and Mickiewicz, 
2006). A study by Djankov et al. (2005) in Russia  indicates that perceptions of low 
corruption combined with a favourable attitude towards entrepreneurship by the general 
population and government officials increases both the probability that Russians become 
entrepreneurs as well as the length of time they spent as  entrepreneurs. A corrupt 
environment distorts entrepreneurial opportunities and returns: it facilitates the development 
of entrepreneurs willing and able to engage in corrupt practices while acting as a barrier that 
hinders the entry or growth of businesses by entrepreneurs who are unwilling to engage in 
corrupt practices.  
 
2.3. Property rights  
Following Williamson (2000), we see property rights at the core of ‘high level’ 
(constitutional characteristics) of the formal institutional order. North and Thomas (1973), 8 
 
Williamson (1985), Barzel (1997), Rodrik (2000), Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) and others 
have argued that property rights systems form the backbone of the modern set of institutions 
that characterize the market economy. Within the theoretical framework introduced by 
Hodler (2009) which links institutional environment with entrepreneurial outcomes, strong 
property rights may be seen as corresponding to low levels of government arbitrariness, 
which in turn is related to limits imposed on opportunities for the government actions 
influenced by non-welfare enhancing political motives. 
Strong formal property rights (which may also be seen as a component of the wider 
characteristics of the rule of law) support the broader development of economic property 
rights that are defined as “individual ability, in expected terms, to consume the good (or the 
services of the asset) directly or to consume it indirectly through exchange” (Barzel, 1997, 
p.3). Accordingly, in recent institutional research, the focus shifts from the assignment of 
rights and certification to the institutional conditions that make execution of these rights, 
especially exchange and other legal contracts based on the property rights, effective. One 
important issue relates to the accessibility of these rights to the population as a whole: a 
property rights system may work well for the economic elite and remain deficient for the 
others (Sonin, 2003).  
Recent theories of entrepreneurship emphasise that “the institution of private property 
... has an important psychological dimension that enhances our feelings of ... internal control 
and personal agency, and it thereby promotes entrepreneurial alertness” (Harper 2003, p. 74). 
For entrepreneurship, it is also important that the property rights not only guarantee the status 
quo but also include the ‘find and keep’ component, which is essential for the aspects of 
entrepreneurship related to discovery, innovation and creation of new resources (Harper 
2003). Property rights that are well protected help promote entrepreneurship and innovation 9 
 
(Parker 2007: 711). In addition, weaker property rights are likely to foster the development of 
predatory forms of entrepreneurial activities
iii (Henrekson 2007:730).  But if property rights, 
such as for intellectual property, are too strong, innovativeness may be reduced (ibid. 731).   
 
2.4. Business Regulations and the Size of the State 
  Parker (2007) offers an overview of the way in which the various aspects of excessive 
business regulation impose costs on entrepreneurs and hamper entrepreneurial activity.  
Djankov et al. (2002) also focus on the regulation of entry though they fail to find an 
unambiguous direct link between this and entrepreneurial entry. The difficulty arises because 
while governance structures may be important for entrepreneurship, the institutional 
spectrum becomes very wide at the lower level of governance. Thus, while at the top of 
institutional hierarchy, the institutional order focuses on protection of property rights, at the 
lower level of governance, the number of regulatory dimensions becomes very large. Hence, 
while the impact of individual regulatory measures is difficult to detect, their joint influence 
may still be significant. We return to the catalogue of regulatory measures and to the data 
reduction methods to deal with this problem in section 3. 
  One way to address the problem of multidimensionality of governance indicators is to 
identify some critical dimension that may cut across all indicators of government activity and 
may represent an important institutional aspect affecting entrepreneurship. We posit that the 
size of the state may provide us with such an opportunity.  
Greater government spending may provide resources to maintain strong institutions, 
and thereby reduce barriers to entrepreneurial entry such as weak property rights as well as 
eliminating some of the incentives for corruption by ill-paid officials.  But it can also create 
major new barriers to entrepreneurship development. For example, a greater level of state 10 
 
expenditure implies weaker budget constraints on government spending. This is likely to 
create conditions under which political non-welfare-related motives begin to dominate in the 
government activity, hampering productive entrepreneurship (Hodler, 2009). 
Moreover, a larger state sector may militate against entrepreneurship, both via the 
collection of taxes and through its expenditures (Parker 2004). Taxes and welfare provision 
may affect entrepreneurial entry via their direct impact on expected returns to entrepreneurial 
activity and its opportunity cost. High and increasing marginal level of taxes may weaken 
incentives for opportunity-driven entrepreneurship by reducing potential gains, while high 
levels of welfare support (and state sector employment) provide alternative sources of income 
and therefore by increasing the alternative wage may reduce the net expected return to 
entrepreneurship (Parker 2004). In addition, a strong welfare state can reduce the incentives 
for necessity entrepreneurs. Henrekson (2005) has shown this to be the case in Sweden, 
where the welfare state has had a negative effect on entrepreneurial behaviour both of 
opportunity and necessity entrepreneurs. Similarly Koellinger and Minniti (2009) provide 
empirical evidence based on data from 16 developed countries that generous unemployment 
benefits are negatively related to nascent entrepreneurship: opportunity and necessity 
entrepreneurs as well as innovative and imitative entrepreneurs were less likely to engage in 
entrepreneurial activities in those developed countries where unemployment benefits were 
high.  11 
 
2.5  Existing empirical findings on the determinants of entrepreneurial activity 
A number of earlier studies have investigated the impact of institutions on 
entrepreneurship. The seven main studies vary considerably in their measures of 
entrepreneurial activity, institutional variables, methods and results, and the differences are 
summarised in Table 1.  
Klapper et al. (2006) build on the Djankov et al. (2002). Their study focuses on 
incorporated companies and measures the effects of entry costs in terms of complying with 
bureaucratic requirements for incorporation on the creation of new firms. The Amadeus data 
set is used to compare the entry of incorporated firms in 34 Western and East European 
countries and in addition to entry cost, institutional variables, such as property rights 
protection and employment rights as well as measures related to the financial and fiscal 
aspects of the policy environment are also included. Their results indicate the rate of new 
corporation creation in industries that tend to be high-entry is relatively lower in countries 
with higher entry costs.  
Desai et al. (2003) draw on the same dataset, aggregating company level data to 
produce industry level indicators as the units of analysis to study the effects of institutional 
indicators on entry. These indicators include: a measure of start-up procedures (from 
Djankov et al. 2002), a corruption indicator (from Transparency International), an index of 
labour regulations (from Botero et al. 2004), an index measuring the independence of courts 
(from the World Bank), a formalism index of the court system (from Djankov et al. 2003) 
and a measure of property rights protection (from the World Economic Forum). In order to 
address the issue of multicollinearity, Desai et al. enter each institutional indicator into a 
separate regression. Their key result, which is in line with Klapper et al. (2006), indicates 
that lower rates of entry pertain to Central and East European (post-Soviet) countries. 12 
 
Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2006) also focus on incorporated firms, but adopt a different 
methodology and use a different dataset. Instead of looking at industry averages, they 
combine country level institutional explanatory variables with firm-level data from the World 
Business Environment Survey. Discrete response models are used to investigate which 
factors affect the likelihood for companies to be incorporated. They find that developed 
financial systems, efficient bankruptcy procedures, lower regulation of corporate entry, 
relatively lower corporate taxes in comparison with personal income taxes, and English, 
German and Scandinavian legal origin increase the likelihood for firms to be incorporated. 
Focusing on entrepreneurs rather than just incorporated firms, Wennekers et al. 
(2005) and Van Stel et al. (2007) utilise GEM to explore the relationship between 
entrepreneurship levels, economic development and institutional variables. Wennekers et al. 
(2005) employ nascent entrepreneurship rates by country as their unit of analysis and use 
2002 GEM data from 36 countries. The explanatory variables to capture institutional 
variation include income per capita (purchasing power parity), variables measuring 
demographics (population growth and education), legal origin (former centralised command 
economy origins) and measures of governance/regulation (fiscal legislation, social security 
system and administrative requirements for starting a new business). Their results indicate 
that there is a positive effect of population growth on entrepreneurship development and 
confirm Desai et al. (2003) in that countries with formerly centrally planned economy origins 
significantly display lower levels of entrepreneurship development. In terms of institutions, 
they find a negative effect of social security but a positive effect of tax revenues as a 
percentage of GDP on nascent entrepreneurship. They point out that the latter result may be 
consistent either with incentives for tax avoidance / evasion or with high-tax countries 
spending more on infrastructure providing a better environment for new firms. 13 
 
 Van Stel et al. (2007) analyse the effect of a particular set of business regulations on 
nascent entrepreneurs and young businesses (defined as less than 42 months old). They draw 
on a broader country range of GEM data (2002 - 2005 for 39 countries) and also base their 
analysis on aggregate mean values. Their measurement of business regulations is drawn from 
the World Bank’s Doing Business indicators and uses five categories: (1) starting a business, 
(2) hiring and firing workers, (3) obtaining credit, (4) paying taxes and (5) closing a business. 
Their results indicate that both minimum capital requirements and labour market rigidity 
have a negative effect while private bureau coverage
iv (i.e. availability of credit information) 
has a positive effect on nascent entrepreneurship rates. They also show that countries with 
more nascent entrepreneurs tend to have more young businesses, supporting the notion that 
more nascent entrepreneurs translates into more actual entrepreneurship.  
Klapper et al. (2007) is based on the largest country sample (76 countries), utilising 
the World Bank Entrepreneurship Survey. The database focuses on registered businesses 
only, and, as the authors note, it is not a legal obligation to register some forms of businesses 
in some countries. Not surprisingly, in contrast to studies based on more encompassing GEM 
data, the authors find a positive association between registration rates and income per capita: 
more formalisation and better coverage of registration of businesses is characteristic of 
wealthier countries. The strongest result on determinants of registration rates relates to the 
positive impact of finance. However, as the authors are aware, using country averages, one 
cannot rule out reverse causality, as a greater number of registered companies alleviate 
informational asymmetries between providers of finance and businesses, perhaps leading to 
standardisation of lending procedures, and therefore creating better conditions for the 
development of the financial sector. 
Finally a recent study by McMullen et al. (2008) focuses on the institutional 14 
 
determinants for opportunity driven and necessity driven entrepreneurial entry. The authors 
estimate models using the individual dimensions of the Wall Street Journal and Heritage 
Foundation indicators of economic freedom. These indicators are used in separate equations 
as well as jointly in a single equation (with the logarithm of GDP per capita used as a control 
variable). The results provide evidence that   property rights are significant for opportunity 
driven entry but not for necessity driven entry. Notably for future research, McMullen et al. 
(2008) recommend the application of factor analysis to the Heritage Foundation indicators; a 
proposal that we adopt in this paper.  
Table 1 summarises these studies in terms of the data sets used, the dependent 
variables chosen, their main outcomes and their estimation model limitations. 
Multicollinearity and omitted variables pose an important limitation in all of these studies. 
Klapper et al. (2006) and Desai et al. (203) run separate regressions for each institutional 
indicator in order to address the problem of multicollinearity. This is a reliable exploratory 
methodology, which may help in rejecting irrelevant factors but does not provide insights as 
to the comparative impact of each of the significant factors. It may also lead to spurious 
results; when a variable is used which is strongly correlated with an omitted variable, the 
coefficients are estimated in an inconsistent way (Acemoglu, 2005).  
Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2006) combine individual level outcomes with country level 
variables
v. This is the methodology we adopt, while focusing on the whole universe of 
potential entrepreneurs rather than existing business owners or just registered entrants.  We 
also use factor analysis to address the collinearity problems in measuring institutional quality 




INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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3. Quantifying Institutional Indicators  
In this section, we describe the measures employed in our empirical work to quantify 
the institutional environment and the methodologies used to tackle multicollinearity. Our 
approach is to apply a data reduction technique – factor analysis – and we report the findings 
from this methodology. In the next section, we consider the remaining data used in our study.  
There is no single universally accepted set of indicators for cross-country institutional 
quality and as indicated above a number of different variables have been used. We adopt the 
variables used by McMullen et al. (2008) which originate from the Heritage Foundation / 
Wall Street Journal set of institutional indicators. Though other indicators exist, the Heritage 
Foundation/Wall Street Journal's indicators are unique in providing the broadest coverage 
and containing the largest number of countries and years.
vi Other studies conducting 
comparable empirical analysis have successfully utilised the Heritage Foundation/Wall Street 
Journal's indicators (Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu 2006; Heckelman 2000; Han and Sturm 
2000).  The Heritage Foundation offers fifty independent indicators grouped into ten broad 
institutional categories related to: trade policy, fiscal burden (including marginal tax rates), 
size of the government sector (government spending) in the economy, monetary policy 
(control of inflation), constraints on foreign investment, direct state involvement in banking 
and finance and regulatory restrictions that go beyond prudential supervision, regulation of 
labour (employment and wages)
vii , security of property rights, business regulations (which 
include entry barriers), and freedom from corruption. These ten categories are intended to 
outline the institutional factors that taken together determine the degree to which economic 16 
 
actors are free to respond to changing world market conditions (see Beach and Kane (2007) 
for a more detailed discussion).  
“Property rights” in the Heritage Foundation index comprises seven areas: (1) 
Freedom from government influence over judicial system; (2) Commercial code defining 
contracts; (3) Sanctioning of foreign arbitration of contract disputes; (4) Government 
expropriation of property; (5) Corruption within the judiciary; (6) Delays in receiving judicial 
decisions and/or enforcement, and (7) Legally granted and protected private property. Thus, 
consistent with De Soto (2001) and Barzel (1997), the indicator of property rights protection 
includes both low risk of expropriation and security of contracts, and remains closely related 
to the slightly more general concept of the “rule of law.” 
We have noted that multicollinearity is a serious issue in institutional analysis, 
because of the abundance of closely related indicators. Theory can guide us on the relative 
importance of different institutional dimensions but is of limited assistance when considering 
the choice of alternative measures for related institutional features. We apply factor analysis 
to tackle the problem, utilising the entire dataset (1995-2008 including 164 countries and nine 
indicators) available on the Heritage Foundation’s website.
viii By ordering the extracted 
factors according to the magnitude of their eigenvalues we produced the following screeplot. 
 
-------------------------------- 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------- 
 
There is a distinct break after the second factor, as the eigenvalue drops from 1.30 to 0.27. 
Accordingly, following the standard practice (see Russell, 2002; Pett et al., 2003; Costello 17 
 
and Osborne, 2005) we retain the first two factors.
ix We next apply oblique rotation (via 




FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------- 
  
While Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal aggregate their indicators into one 
average measure of ‘economic freedom’, our results demonstrate that the set of indicators has 
more than one dimension and enforcing a one-dimensional scale on it may not be a valid 
technique. We need to look more closely into what are the dimensions suggested by factor 
analysis. 
Figure 2 reveals that the property rights indicator has the highest loadings on the first 
factor, which itself explains most of the institutional variance. "Freedom from corruption", 
ranks as the second highest loadings on the first factor. Most of other institutional indicators 
measuring various dimensions of regulation are clustered around these. Thus, most but not all 
of the Heritage-Wall Street Journal indicators are located here. We therefore label the first 
factor as market freedom, to relate it but also distinguish from the label of ‘economic 
freedom’ used  by Heritage-Wall Street Journal. 
 In Figure 2 we also see  that the dimensions ”fiscal freedom” and the size of the 
government expenses in GDP  should  both be considered separately from the other 
institutional factors. They form the second factor that we label (limited) size of state sector. 
While the impact of taxes and the impact of government expenses (including welfare) on 
entrepreneurship can be separated conceptually, they are obviously connected empirically via 18 
 
the size of the state budget, and in practice their independent effects prove difficult to 
identify.
xi Linking our results to the discussion in Section 2, we note that out of the four 
institutional dimensions identified using Williamson's (2000) framework, for our data the 
first three (freedom from corruption, property rights, measures of regulation) are difficult to 
disentangle empirically, while the fourth (government size) stands apart.  
 
-------------------------------- 
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------- 
 
In Figure 3, we show the country - specific factor scores, finding the Scandinavian 
countries, Belgium, Netherlands and Germany to be located in the upper left corner, with 
market freedom and an extensive state sector. In contrast, Hong Kong and Singapore are two 
economies which combine market freedom with a small state sector. The Anglo-Saxon 
economies are located in between, characterised by conditions of market freedom and a mid-
sized state. In contrast, Latin American countries (with the notable exception of Chile), 
Russia, China and India are all countries where the size of government spending and taxation 
remains relatively low, but market freedom is weak. The weak negative correlation between 
the two factors is driven by the fact that there are no countries in the lower left corner of the 
graph. To explain this, we may notice that the factor we labelled ‘market freedom’ (low 
corruption, low degree of arbitrariness in the executive branch of the government, more 
limited and more functional regulations) may also be taken as a measure of institutional 
quality.  This suggests that, paradoxically, a large state sector cannot be built where 19 
 
institutional quality is low, perhaps because the latter affects the state’s capacity to collect 
taxes. 
  Another way of interpreting the relationship between the two factors is through the 
Acemoglu and Verdier (2000) model, which stipulates that while state intervention may have 
a positive overall impact, some corruption may be unavoidable to achieve an efficient 
outcome in the feasible range.  This would imply a positive correlation between the two 
factors, at least over some section of the distribution: a larger state sector would be associated 
with greater corruption leading to an ordering of observations along the diagonal. However, 
this is not what we observe.  Rather, the findings in Figure 3 are more consistent with 
Hellman et al. (2003): in the countries with a large state sector, corruption may be lower, 
perhaps because special interests become directly embedded within the state sector (see also: 
Mickiewicz 2009). Acemoglu and Verdier’s (2000) perspective is motivated by the efficiency 
theory of institutions, which assumes that institutional outcomes have some traits of efficient 
feasible solutions. In contrast, Botero et al. (2004) argue that institutional outcomes may also 
be explained using political theories (assuming some entrenched special interests) and by 
institutional inertia (as represented by legal origin). As noted above, inefficient economic 
institutions may persist and both political factors and institutional continuity can contribute to 
this outcome. This theoretical perspective is consistent with the ordering of both factors that 
results from our factor analysis. 
    Given the importance of corruption in our analysis, we next explore if the 
relationship in Figure 3 holds when factor scores are replaced by the two individual source 
indicators taken from the Heritage-Wall Street Journal dataset. Accordingly, we plot in 
Figure the relationship between the variable 'freedom from corruption' and 'government size'. 
The results are consistent with Figure 3 but stronger; a weak negative correlation in Figure 3 20 
 
(correlation coefficient: 0.07) becomes somewhat stronger in Figure 4 (coefficient at 0.22). 
Institutional theory proves useful in interpreting the results. At the bottom, we have countries 
with weak institutions and small government size (such as Mexico, Thailand and South 
Africa). In contrast, lower levels of corruption are also related to larger government size in 
countries such as Sweden and Denmark. Again, this interpretation runs against Acemoglu 
and Verdier’s (2000) model, and is consistent with our interpretation of corruption. It also 
allows for reverse causality: it may be corruption that makes large government impossible, as 
argued above.  Thus though the redistributive aims of many Latin American governments 
may be comparable to those held by Scandinavian politicians, Latin American governments 
may be constrained by their institutional capacity to implement those policies.  
 
-------------------------------- 
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------- 
 
We have shown that the correlations between the factors and between the single measures of 
corruption and government size are limited, enabling us to identify their separate impacts on 
entrepreneurship. Moreover, the ordering of countries along the diagonal in Figure 4 is 
partially driven by the level of development. Hence, it is important to control for this in our 
empirical work.   21 
 
 
4. Data and Estimation Methodology 
 
4.1 Individual Level Data 
Our individual level data are drawn from GEM and are generated through surveys creating 
stratified samples of at least 2,000 individuals per country. The sample is drawn from the 
whole working age population in each participating country and therefore captures both 
entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurial activity in this paper is new, nascent 
start-up activity, defined as those individuals between the ages of 18 – 64 years who have 
‘taken some action’ toward creating a new business in the past year, and expect to own a 
share of those businesses they are starting, which must not have paid any wages or salaries 
for more than three months (Reynolds et al., 2005; Minniti et al., 2005b). In contrast, 
established entrepreneurs are defined as individuals who own or manage a company and have 
paid wages or salaries for more than 42 months (ibid.). We utilise all available GEM data 
from the 1998-2005 surveys. Our survey database includes 47 individual country samples. 
Additional data details are reported in Table 2.  
 
4.2. Control variables 
Apart from the institutional variables discussed above, we control for the level of 
economic development as well as personal characteristics of entrepreneurs that might affect 
entrepreneurial entry. Commencing with cross- country characteristics, a number of studies 
have documented the existence of a relationship between entrepreneurial activity and 
economic development (Wennekers et al. 2005; Carree et al. 2002; Acs et al. 1994), for 
which we control by including a measure of per capita GDP (purchasing power parity). 22 
 
Similar to McMullen et al. (2008), we found that the curvilinear relationship represented by 
natural logarithm of GDP per capita (p.c.) fits the data best. We also verified that using both 
GDP p.c. and GDP p.c. squared does not alter our main results; we do not report these 
equations because overall they perform worse than when the natural logarithm of GDP p.c. is 
used.
xii  
In addition, the link between the overall (cyclical) economic performance in a country 
and the incentives to entrepreneurial entry are often discussed. Two conflicting effects may 
occur, and it is difficult to decide a priori which has the stronger impact. On the one hand, 
entrepreneurship may be ‘recession-push’, as the opportunity cost of entrepreneurial entry is 
lower when existing firms are not expanding, which reduces new job openings. On the other 
hand, there may be also ‘prosperity-pull’ effect; that is, a growing economy leads to larger 
expected gains from entrepreneurial activity (Parker, 2004). The rate of economic growth has 
been shown by Van Stel et al. (2007) to have a positive effect on the rate of opportunity 
entrepreneurship. Some ambiguity in these results is resolved by Koellinger and Thurik 
(2009), who demonstrate that time gaps should be taken into account. Following them,  we 
include GDP growth as a control variable but lag it one year.   
The scale of entrepreneurial activity is also influenced by the supply of finance. An 
efficient system of property rights may be a necessary but is not a sufficient condition for a 
well-developed financial system. One can find countries which have implemented a relatively 
efficient system of property rights, while their financial system remains underdeveloped, for 
example some of the countries that switched from a command to market economy. In these 
cases, entrepreneurs may be unable to carry through their projects, either because the cost of 
finance is too high or because they face binding financial constraints (Gros and Steinherr, 
2004; Mickiewicz, 2005). The findings on this issue in the empirical literature are mixed. 23 
 
Grilo and Irigoyen (2006) report a negative effect of the perception of lack of finance on the 
probability of being self-employed, while Grilo and Thurik (2005) are unable to identify any 
effect. The ambiguity may result from the fact that entrepreneurs often substitute financial 
resources from the informal sector for those from the formal sector (Korosteleva and 
Mickiewicz, 2008). We found that polynomial representation has the best fit for the data and 
we report the set of results based on this. 
It would be ideal to control for individual differences in access to finance, because 
Evans and Jovanovic (1989) show that capital constraints lead to a positive relationship 
between the probability of becoming self-employed and the assets of the entrepreneur. 
Similarly, Evans and Leighton (1989) show that the exploitation of entrepreneurial 
opportunities is more common when people have greater financial capital (see also: Hurst 
and Lusardi (2004)). However, our data set does not offer a reasonable proxy, though we 
capture an aspect of the individual's financial position by using a dummy variable which 
indicates if a potential entrepreneur had been providing funds for business financing in the 
past.  
We also control for individual personal and factor supply characteristics, including 
gender, age and human capital.  Most research indicates that men have a higher probability of 
becoming entrepreneurs than women (Minniti et al. 2005a; Verheul et al. 2006; Reynolds et 
al. 2002). The relationship between entrepreneurship and age is typically found to be inverse-
U -shaped, with the maximum found at a relatively young age (Levesque and Minniti, 2006). 
Findings on human capital are an important area of research in terms of its 
relationship to entrepreneurship; though the results for developed economies measured in 
terms of education are mixed. Robinson and Sexton (1994) and Cooper and Dunkelberg 
(1987) find that the decision to become self-employed is influenced by education while the 24 
 
results of Delmar and Davidsson (2000) and Davidsson and Honig (2003) establish the 
significance of education for nascent entrepreneurs  and Parker (2004) shows that 
entrepreneurs tend to be more educated than non- entrepreneurs.   
Wennekers et al. (2005) found a significant and positive relationship between the 
number of incumbent business owners and entrepreneurial start-ups. Role models may for 
example help by providing information, which alleviates both uncertainty and the cost of 
starting the business (Minniti, 2005). We therefore also control for whether the potential 
nascent entrepreneur knows any other entrepreneurs. Another factor that may affect start-up 
rates in different economic settings is whether the entrepreneur is employed while starting 
their business, and we include a variable indicating if the individual is in employment.   
Definitions and descriptive statistics for all variables, including nascent 
entrepreneurship, are presented in Table 2.  
 
------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------- 
  
4.3 Framework for analysis 
If i denotes individuals, j denotes countries and t denotes time, we estimate an 
equation of the form: 
entijt = f(Market freedomjt, , Size of State Sectorjt, GDP/capitajt, GDP growth ratejt, 
Availability of  Financejt, Individual Level Controlsjit), 
 25 
 
where ent is a dummy variable denoting  whether or not an individual in a particular country 
at a particular date is engaged in nascent start up activity.  We use Probit as our estimator, 
reporting robust standard errors. We also report marginal effects instead of coefficients. We 
allow for the possibility that the observations are not independent for each country-year 
sample in our dataset. This is reflected in the estimated variance-covariance matrix and 
reported coefficients and we also cluster standard errors on country-years. Given the sample 
size, all our standard errors would be artificially suppressed and many country level variables 
would become significant without this correction. As an alternative strategy, we also applied 
specifications including a full set of country and year fixed effects. Unsurprisingly, these 
models were not reliable and the overall Wald statistics could not be produced. This is 
because the sample is highly unbalanced and the institutional indicators do not vary greatly 
over time, which makes it difficult and inappropriate to estimate a fixed effects model. 
Moreover, institutional indicators are assessed with a measurement error, and there are 
probably lags between the actual phenomena and perceptions. For instance, it is likely that 
perceptions of corruption follow actual corruption with lags, and the length of these may 
vary. In order to alleviate this problem, all the country level variables are loaded with a one 
year lag. 
Our estimation strategy is as follows: first we estimate the model including the two factors 
obtained by data reduction methods: market freedom and size of state sector (Table 3, model 
(1)). To explore the relationship between the level of development and the institutional 
variables, we then estimate the same model excluding 10% of the sample corresponding to 
the richest countries (Table 3, model (2)).
xiii  
To consider more carefully the individual institutions behind our “factors”, we re-
estimate the two models described above replacing the factors with each of the ten underlying 26 
 
‘economic freedom’ indicators. We limit our presentation of these results to the combinations 
which were most significant: these proved to be ‘the size of the government’ indicator 
(retaining reverse ordering, as is presented in the original data) and 'freedom from corruption' 
(Table 3, models (3) and (4))
xiv. 
To check robustness of our indicators, we report two models where the two factors 
are replaced with alternative indicators (Table 3, models (5) and (6)). First, the   market 
freedom is replaced with an indicator for the "effective constraints on the executive branch of 
the government" obtained from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers 2007).
xv 
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), argue that the effective constraints on the discretionary power 
of the executive branch of the government serves as a good overall proxy for the protection 
of property rights. We also replace the size of state sector factor with a variable, the "ratio of 
government expenses to GDP", as reported in the World Bank "World Development 
Indicators".  
Finally, as a further robustness check, we run a fixed effects model with robust 
standard errors on country level averages, which are available for a longer time span (that is 
for 1999-2009) from GEM. Our dependent variable is now the proportion of respondents 
involved in a start-up activity (‘nascent entrepreneurs’); alternatively, we also use a different 
functional form with better distributional characteristics, transforming this measure into 
logarithms. On the right hand side, we include freedom of corruption, size of the government, 
and control for the logarithm of GDP per capita (purchasing power parity) and GDP rate of 
growth, which we continue to lag one period to alleviate simultaneity bias. 27 
 
5. Results and discussion 
 
 
5.1. Specifications and empirical results 
 
------------------------------------------------ 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------ 
 
Table 3 presents the six estimation models
xvi.  We observe in the first two models that 
the two institutional factors have the expected signs but different levels of significance. In 
particular, the market freedom is insignificant when the total country sample is used, though 
when the richest countries are removed, it becomes weakly significant.  The size of state 
sector factor is positive and highly significant in both specifications. These are our central 
results and the remaining regressions explore their robustness and implications.   
To ensure our results are not an artefact of the use of factor analysis, we entered all 
the institutional variables separately instead.  Due to limitations of space, we focus on the 
most significant indicators. Reassuringly, these prove to be, first, "freedom from corruption"  
and the "the government size" (i.e. individual Heritage indicator, not to be confused with the 
factor used previously, size of state sector), coded in reverse order by the Heritage 
Foundation i.e. with lower values representing more government spending. These regressions 
are reported in models 3 and 4.  These confirm our previous results; both the size of the 
government and freedom from corruption variables are found to be significant, with the latter 
increasing in significance from model 3 to model 4 where the richest 10% of the countries 
have been removed.  
In models 5 and 6 we use alternative indicators of institutions, drawn instead from 
Polity IV, with "constraints on executive" as an alternative measure of the market freedom. 
As previously, the results suggest that the link between market freedom and entrepreneurship 28 
 
is weak; the variable is marginally significant for the whole sample (model 5) but marginally 
insignificant when the richest countries are excluded (model 6). On the other hand, the 
estimated coefficients on government expenses remain highly significant in both models.
xvii  
Finally, the results of our robustness check using fixed effects model is reported in 
Table 4. We find that both freedom of corruption and government size retain their signs, but 
only the latter is significant. If corruption is a slowly evolving embedded informal norm, the 
within variation captured by fixed effects will be largely driven by measurement errors, so it 
is unsurprising that the corresponding coefficient becomes insignificant. Nevertheless, the 
identification problem remains: there may be other dimensions of long term institutional 
embeddedness apart from corruption that we do not include. Therefore, this strong robustness 
check confirms our results on government size, but leads to some caution in relation to our 
previous results on corruption.    
 
Our results with respect to the control variables largely conform with those in the 
literature. As shown previously (e.g. Wennekers et al., 2005) the relationship between the 
level of economic development and entrepreneurship is negative and non-linear; a 
logarithmic function performs best with our data.  We also confirm that access to finance is 
important for entrepreneurial activity (Klapper et al, 2006); formal finance is less important 
in poor countries, but becomes increasingly significant at the higher stages of economic 
development (Demingucr-Kunt et al, 2008). At lower levels of development, the impact of 
credit to private sector on entrepreneurship is negative, perhaps because it is crowding out 
informal finance, though it becomes positive at higher levels of GDP per capita (Wennekers  
et al, 2005). Credit provision becomes insignificant once we eliminate the richest countries. 
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  Men and current owners are significantly more likely to start new businesses (Minniti 
et al, 2005a), as are people who provided finance as business angels in the past (Mickiewicz, 
2005).  We also confirm the relevance of business networks: individuals who know other 
entrepreneurs are significantly more likely to start a new business. This result is not 
surprising given that a number of studies have identified the importance of entrepreneurial 
networks for opportunity recognition (Hills et al. 1997; Singh et al. 1999) and entrepreneurial 
alertness (Ardichvili et al. 2003). However networks developed in weak institutional 
environments may not complement markets (creating synergies) but substitute for them, 
creating transaction costs. As a result, much networking activity may not be productivity-
enhancing (Aidis et al. 2008: 670). Human capital as measured by post-secondary and higher 
education has a significantly positive impact on entrepreneurial entry (Davidsson and Honig, 
2003). Finally we confirm a significant, quadratic effect for age in our regression models, 
implying that in the relevant range older people are less likely to become entrepreneurs 




Our analysis provides insights into the effect of variations in institutional quality on 
entrepreneurial entry. We identify a significant and robust negative relationship between the 
size of the state sector and entrepreneurship.  Moreover, freedom from corruption has a 
positive and significant impact on entrepreneurial entry, albeit this result is slightly less 
robust.  However, contrary to some previous findings (Van Stel, 2007; McMullen et al, 
2008), potential entrepreneurs are only marginally influenced by market freedom, especially 
if they do not reside in the sample's richest countries.  
Future researchers may wish to distinguish more carefully between institutions and to 
extend our framework to alternative forms of entrepreneurship, such as potential 
entrepreneurs, existing entrepreneurs or high growth entrepreneurs. Whereas existing 
entrepreneurs and high growth entrepreneurs may be more significantly influenced by the 
quality of property rights, our analysis indicates that this may play less of a role for nascent 
entrepreneurs, especially in more developed economies. Similarly, while current 
entrepreneurs may have learned to function in their existing institutional environment, even 
where corruption is prevalent, our results indicate that entrepreneurial entry is greater where 
there is less corruption. In addition, the results suggest that the perceptions of corruption play 
a significant role in reducing entrepreneurial aspirations, a view consistent with other studies 
(Djankov et al. 2005; Aidis and Mickiewicz, 2006; Aidis and Adachi 2007; Aidis et al. 
2008). 
Our main result concerning the impact of the size of the state sector abstracts from 
some important issues; the characteristics of the state sector as well as its size are important. 
Baumol et al. (2007) argue against welfare provision based on employment status as this 
discourages movements from employment towards entrepreneurship. Thus, some of the key 31 
 
policy discussions with respect to the state sector and entrepreneurship should be about its 
design as well as its size. 
Our analysis is subject to a number of limitations. Firstly, though the GEM data 
provides excellent uniform data for cross-country comparisons, there is potential sample 
selection bias because, given the cost of conducting a GEM country survey, few participating 
countries have very weak institutions. Thus our results more accurately pertain to middle and 
high income countries. Moreover, from the perspective of institutional change, the data are 
only available for relatively few years,  we may not have sufficient inter-temporal variation 
to be confident that causality runs from institutional quality to entrepreneurship rather than 




When the size of the government is considered from a theoretical perspective, one 
could argue that a larger government may be associated with better conditions for 
entrepreneurship. More extensive government spending may create a basis for stronger 
institutions, funding law and order enforcement systems that protect contracts and supporting 
infrastructure that may enhance entrepreneurship. Conversely, lower government spending 
might weaken the business environment. However, we do not observe this positive 
relationship over the empirical range of current economies. In contrast, we find a robust 
negative relationship between the size of the government and entrepreneurial entry. 
Consistent with earlier findings (Parker, 2004; Henrekson, 2005; Koellinger and Minniti, 
2009), we argue that an extensive welfare state supported by high level of taxation reduce the 
incentives for nascent entrepreneurs. This in turn, has wider implications for economic 32 
 
development.   
Our findings also have implications for policy-makers. We have found that that 
individual choice to become an entrepreneur is heavily dependent on two aspects of the 
business environment: on the size of the state sector and – based on somewhat weaker results 
– on freedom from corruption. Policymakers might benefit from focusing their attention on 
the elements of the institutional environment that are most critical at a given level of 
economic development in their efforts to enhance entrepreneurial activity. Reducing 
corruption is important but we have argued that corruption is not just a rational choice 
response of economic actors but also an embedded informal institution.  Hence, its 
eradication cannot be achieved solely through better monitoring and by institutional design to 
improve bureaucratic procedures.    In addition, one needs to target deeper issues of social 
attitudes and values, and to influence those through the educational system and media 
awareness. Moreover, at every level of economic development, increasing the size of the 
state sector reduces the incentives to be entrepreneurial. This trade-off needs to be taken into 
consideration when making policy choices: policies to increase the fiscal role of the state are 
in direct conflict with aspirations to create a more entrepreneurial society. In a global 
perspective, it is South-East Asia, characterised by limited fiscalism and dynamic 
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Table 1. Summary of existing research on institutions and entrepreneurship development 
 Klapper  et al. (2006)  Desai et al. (2003)  Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2006) 
Data set used 
 




Industry level rates of creation of incorporated firms 
 
Industry level rates of creation of 
incorporated firms 
Individual level indicator variable related to 
incorporated form 
Institutional variables included:  •  Entry costs (incorporation procedures) 
•  Property right protection 
•  Employment rights 
•  Financial system development 
•  Tax disadvantage 
•  Legal origin 
•  Entry costs (incorporation 
procedures) 
•  Corruption 
•  Labour regulations 
•  Independence of banks 
•  Court system 
•  Property right protection 
•  Legal origin 
•  Entry cost (incorporation procedures) 
•  Financial system development 
•  Tax disadvantage 
•  Legal origin 
•  Bankruptcy procedures 
•  Legal protection in solving disputes 
•  Share of unofficial economy 
•  Protection of shareholders rights 
 
Outcomes:  •  New corporation creation in industries that tend 
to be high entry are relatively lower in 
countries with higher entry costs; 
•  Entry costs have a greater effect in richer 
countries than in poorer countries 
•  Entry costs tend to be lower in countries with 
English or Scandinavian legal origins. 
 
•  Communist legal origin has 
negative effect. 
•  Communist legal origin has negative effec
•  Financial sector development and bankrup
procedures has positive effect 
•  Tax disadvantage makes incorporation les
likely 
•  Entry costs have significant negative effec
Handling of multicollinearity in 
institutional indicators: 
•  Entering each institutional indicator into a 
separate regression 
•  Entering each institutional 
indicator into a separate regression. 
•  Factor analysis; using extracted factors in
of original variables.   48 
 Table 1. Summary of existing research on institutions and entrepreneurship development (continued) 
 Wennekers  et al. (2005)  Van Stel et al. (2007)  Klapper et al. (2007) McMullen  et al. (2008) 
Data set used 
 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor  Global Entrepreneurship Monitor  WB Entrepreneurship Survey  Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
Dependent variable 
 
Country level rates of nascent 
entrepreneurship 
Country level rates of nascent 
entrepreneurship & young business  
Rate 
Country level rates of creation of 
incorporated firms 
 
Country level rates of nascent  
Entrepreneurship split between 
opportunity and necessity 
Institutional 
variables included: 
•  Entry costs (administrative 
requirements for starting a new 
business) 
•  Fiscal legislation 
•  Social security 
•  Former communist country 
economic origin 
 
Variables in 5 categories: 
•  Starting a business 
•  Hiring and firing workers 
•  Getting credit 
•  Paying taxes 
•  Closing a business 
•  Entry costs (incorporation procedures) 
•  Employment rights 
•  Financial system development 
•  Quality of state governance 
 
Ten individual dimensions of the 
Wall Street Journal / Heritage 
Foundation “Economic Freedom”  
set of institutional indicators 
Outcomes:  •  Higher social security 
expenditure has a negative 
effect; 
•  Higher government tax revenues 
have a positive effect; 
•  Communist legal origin has 
a negative effect. 
•  Minimum capital requirements hav
negative effect;  
•  Labour market rigidity has a negati
effect; 
•  Countries with more nascent 
entrepreneurs also have more young 
businesses; 
•  GDP growth rates have a positive 
effect on opportunity entrepreneurship;
•  Private bureau coverage has a  
positive effect.   
•  Financial system matters for per capita 
entry rate,  but significance is not 
robust (sensitive to estimation 
method) 
•  Entry procedures matter for entry rates 
per capita, but significance is not 
robust (sensitive to estimation method, 
also less significant as compared with 
the result on finance) 
 
 
The most significant result is 
that protection of property rights is 
associated positively with 





•  General to specific: excluding 
insignificant variables.  
•  General to specific: excluding 
insignificant variables. 
•  Applying different estimation methods 
(GEE, GLS) and different definition 
of dependent variable to check for 
robustness 
Applying equations 
with single indicators 
entered separately 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics 
 
Variable  Min  Max  Mean    Std. Dev. 
          
Start-up activity (%)  0  100  3.4    18.1 
Owner/man. of existing businesses (%)  0  100  5.3    22.4 
Business angel in past 3 y (%)  0  100  2.7    16.4 
Knows entrepreneurs (%)  0  100  36.1    48.0 
Currently in employment (%)  0  100  51.1    50.0 
          
Education: secondary or more (%)  0  100  65.3    47.6 
Education: postsecondary or more (%)  0  100  22.0    41.4 
Education: higher (%)  0  100  10.6    30.8 
          
Female  0  100  52.8    49.9 
Age  1  104  43    17 
          
Market freedom (factor 1)  -1.10  2.25  1.23    0.73 
Size of state sector (factor 2)  -3.28  1.76  -0.89    1.17 
Government size (reverse sign) (Heritage)  0  94  48    25 
Freedom from corruption (Heritage)  19  100  71    20 
Constraint on executive (Polity IV)  3  7  6.7    0.9 
          
Government expenses / GDP (%)  11  47  32    9 
Annual GDP growth rate (%)  -11  11  3    2 
Credit to priv. sector / GDP (%)  7  231  106    45 
GDP per capita, purchasing power  




1/ All country level variables are lagged one year. 
 
2/ Heritage Foundation / Wall Street Journal indicator of government size is coded so that larger 
value represents lower level of government expenditure; the variable is kept in this form. 
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Notes to Table 3: 
 
*** Denotes significance at 99.9%  
**   Denotes significance at 99.0% 
*     Denotes significance at 95.0% 
†     Denotes significance at 90.0% 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.       
 
Government size: the larger values represent lower government expenses and lower taxation.      
 
Country level variables lagged one year to alleviate potential endogeneity. 
 
 
1 The larger values represent lower government expenses and lower taxation.     
Table 3. Estimation Results 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  All  w/t highest  All  w/t highest  All  w/t highest 
Variables:  Sample  10% GDPpc  Sample  10% GDPpc  Sample  10% GDPpc 
            
Owner/man. of exist. busin.  -.37* (.18)  -.39* (.18)  -.37* (.18)  -.39* (.18)  -.27 (.20)  -.24 (.20) 
Business angel in past 3 y  3.89***(.34)  3.62***(.39)  3.85***(.32) 3.60***(.37) 3.55***(.34) 3.42***(.39) 
Knows entrepreneurs  3.69***(.25)  3.30***(.24) 3.68***(.24) 3.29***(.23) 3.58***(.24) 3.33***(.25) 
In employment  .80***(.24)  .87***(.22)  .77***(.20) .82***(.20) .47*(.20) .51*(.23) 
            
Education: second. or more  .45*(.19)  .39*(.19) .45*(.18) .41*(.18)  .48**(.17) .38*(.17) 
Education: postsec. or more  .58***(.14)  .42**(.14) .52***(.14)  .35*(.14) .36*(.15) .30†(.16) 
Education: higher  .95**(.29)  1.06**(.35)  1.03***(.28) 1.16***(.35) 1.48***(.31) 1.74***(.32) 
            
Female -1.39***(.10)  -1.28***(.10)  -1.39***(.10)  -1.29***(.09)  -1.53***(.12)  -1.40***(.12) 
Age  .04 (.04)  .04 (.05)  .05 (.04)  .04 (.05)  .14*** (.04)  .15*** (.04) 
Age squared (x1000)  -1.09*(.50)  -1.00†(.60) -1.11*(.49) -1.05†(.59) -2.27***(.46)  -2.33***(.54) 
            
Log GDP pc (ppp)  -.63*(.26)  -.88**(.27)  -.69**(.22) -.90***(.22)  -.63**(.24) -.76*(.30) 
Annual GDP growth rate  -.05 (.04)  -.06 (.04) -.09*  (.04)  -.09*(.04) -.07*(.03) -.07*(.03) 
Credit to priv. sector / GDP  -.02†(.01)  -.00(.01) -.04*(.02)  -.02(.02) -.04*(.02)  -.03(.02) 
Credit / GDP sq. (x1000)  .11(.01) .01(.01) .15*(.01)  .03(.01) .22**(.01)  .17†(.01) 
          
Market freedom (factor 1)  .32(.28) .49†(.27)         
Size of state sector (factor 2)
1  .81***(.15) .75***(.15)        
Freedom from corruption      .02*(.01)  .03**(.01)     
Government size (reverse)      .04***(.01)  .04***(.01)     
Constraints on executive          .26† (.16)  .29 (.19) 
Government expenses / GDP        -.10***(.02)  -.09***(.02) 
            
Number of observations  350397  317282  350397  317282  268825  241770 
Wald Chi squared  3725***  3351***  3195***  2906***  2557***  2455*** 





























Significance levels denoted as in Table 3. 
 
GDP growth and GDP level lagged one year to alleviate simultaneity. 
Table 4. Estimation Results:  
country fixed effects (within) panel estimator 
    
 (1)  (2) 




Natural logarithm of  
country level startup rate 
    
Log GDP pc (ppp)  5.91***(1.16)  5.69***(0.92) 
Annual GDP growth rate  0.06*(0.03)  0.03 (0.02) 
    
Freedom from corruption  -0.02 (0.02)  0.01 (0.02) 
Government size (reverse)  0.03*(0.01)  0.03*(0.01) 
    
Constant -58.03***(11.06)  -60.77***(8.65) 
    
Number of observations  369  369 
F statistics (4, 73)  8.39***  14.48*** 
Within R squared  0.09  0.13 
Between R squared  0.07  0.21 
Overall R squared  0.03  0.07 
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Figure 1. 







Explanation of indicators: 
 
 
Fiscal freedom is a measure of the tax burden imposed by government. It includes both the direct tax burden in terms 
of the top tax rates on individual and corporate incomes and the overall amount of tax revenue as a percentage of GDP. 
 
Government size (also referred to as government spending) considers the level of government expenditures as a 
percentage of GDP including consumption and transfers.  
 
Monetary freedom combines a measure of price stability with an assessment of price controls using weighted average 
inflation rate for the past three years. 
 
Financial freedom is a measure of banking security as well as a measure of independence from government control. 
 
Trade freedom is a composite measure of the absence of tariff and non-tariff barriers that affect imports and exports of 
goods and services. 
 
Investment freedom measures restrictions in the following five areas: national treatment of foreign investment; 
sectoral investment restrictions; expropriation of investment without fair compensation; foreign exchange 
compensation; foreign exchange controls and capital controls. 
 
Business freedom is a quantitative measure of the ability to start, operate, and close a business and represents the 
overall burden of regulation as well as the efficiency of government in the regulatory process. 
 
Property rights indicator provides an assessment of the ability of individuals to accumulate private property, secured 
by clear laws that are fully enforced by the state. 
 
Freedom from corruption is derived primarily from Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). 
It  measures the perceived level of public-sector corruption in 180 countries and territories around the world. The CPI 
is a 'survey of surveys', based on 13 different expert and business surveys. 
 
source: http:// www.heritage.org, http://www.transparency.org 
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i Entrepreneurship is a multidimensional concept (see Acs and Szerb, 2009) and our results may not apply to measures 
other than entry. We motivate our focus by the work of Lumpkin and Dess (1996) who state ‘the essential act of 
entrepreneurship is new entry’ (1996: 136). See also Acs (2006). 
ii For example, the highly corrupt environment in Russia may explain the low levels of entrepreneurship there (see also 
Aidis and Adachi, 2008; Aidis, et al. 2008).  
iii An example of predatory entrepreneurship in this case would be 'private' security companies which provide business 
protection at a price and profit from maintaining weak local property rights (e.g. Sicily). It is a form of destructive 
entrepreneurship  and has a negative overall effect on economic growth.  
iv  This variable measures the existence and extensiveness of private firms or non-governmental organizations that 
maintain databases on the creditworthiness of borrowers (Van Stel et al. 2007:178). 
v  Koellinger (2008) applies similar methodology to GEM data focusing on innovativeness. 
vi World Bank ‘Governance’ indicators would be an attractive alternative. Unfortunately, it is only in the most recent 
period where those are reported annually. For the period we cover some years are missing. 
vii This indicator is available since 2005. 
viii As accessed in February 2008.  Since labour freedom is available from 2005 only, it was not included. However, we 
verified it did not affect the results significantly. When we run factor analysis for a shorter period but with freedom of 
labour included, the first two factors still explain most of the variance, and loadings of labour freedom are not high on 
either of them. Empirically, labour freedom is negatively correlated with the size of the government spending and 
therefore its impact is difficult to separate where the size of the government is taken into account (see Aidis et al., 
2007). 
ix However, retaining two factors come at cost of high uniqueness value for the trade freedom indicator (at 0.71), i.e. 
this variable is not well explained by the extracted factors. Generally however, sampling adequacy is high: overall 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure is 0.85. 
x As argued by Costello and Osborne (2005), orthogonal rotation is not utilising all available information. Moreover, if 
factors are truly uncorrelated, the results of oblique rotation are very similar to the results of orthogonal rotation. In our 
case the correlation between the two factors after oblique rotation is -0.14. We use oblimin method following 
recommendation by Fabrigar et al. (1999) and Russell (2002). We also applied promax. We verified that the results 
based on the two are almost indistinguishable for our data. 
xi However, while the size of the government measure as reported by Heritage is simply based on the volume of 
government expenses, the tax measure includes the impact of marginal tax rates in addition to tax revenues.    57
                                                                                                                                                                 
xii These results can be obtained from the authors upon request. Estimation with GDP per capita squared does not 
produce a credible Wald statistics for the probit model. At the same time, the main results are not affected. 
xiii In a previous version, reported as working paper XYZ we also used 20% threshold. The results were not affected. 
xiv Additional results can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
xv  The Polity IV Project captures global trends in governance and currently includes 163 countries. The polity 
conceptual scale examines concomitant dimensions of democratic and autocratic authority in governing institutions. It 
is based on six component that measure three key qualities: executive recruitment, constraints to executive authority 
and political competition (see also http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm) 
xvi It is likely that there is a U-shaped relationship between the level of development and  entrepreneurial entry as 
postulated by Acs et al. (1994), Carree et al. (2002) and Wennekers et al. (2005). Unfortunately, with regards to  our 
data, when we attempt to enter a linear and quadratic GDP per capita term in our specifications, the overall Wald 
statistics for the probit regression cannot be produced. For this reason, we stick to the logarithmic transformation. 
xvii Given the high significance of the size of the government we also explored what happens if a quadratic term is 
added. It is insignificant. 